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THE SUPERIORITY OF THE DIGITAL SERVICE TAX OVER
SIGNIFICANT DIGITAL PRESENCE PROPOSALS
Wei Cui
Responding to calls for reallocating taxing rights over multinationals’ profits to reflect the place
of user value creation, the OECD recently announced a Program of Work to implement
international tax reform. I use the European Commission’s 2018 proposal to introduce the
“significant digital presence” concept into income tax treaties as an example of the type of
approach the OECD favors, and argue that it is inferior to recently proposed digital services taxes
(DSTs). DSTs directly address the question of where profits should be allocated and taxed, while
SDP proposals subordinate this vital question to superfluous treaty conventions. Global tax
coordination deserves better focal points.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the UK government, the European Commission (EC), and several European
national governments separately announced bold legislative proposals for enacting a new tax
policy instrument,

the “digital services tax” (DST). 1 These governments demanded the

international community to explore long-term strategies to reforming international business
income taxation so that taxing right over the profits of multinational digital platform companies
(e.g. such as Google, Facebook and Amazon) could be reallocated to reflect the value contributed
by platform users. DST proposals are unilateral, “interim solutions” meant to prod nations into
multilateral action: DSTs would be enacted unless countries come to agree on reforming
international income taxation in satisfactory manners.
The bid by DST-proposing countries to set the agenda for international tax reform has been
remarkably successful. In May 2019, the Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation (OECD) announced a “Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy” (OECD 2019b). The document
explicitly considers, among several other reform proposals, methods that refer to “user
participation” for revising the profit allocation rules under international income taxation (see also
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See HM Treasury 2018a and 2018b (UK policy statements); [EC 2018a]; European Commission 2018a and 2018b
(proposed Directives on SDP and DST, respectively); KPMG 2019 (Spain); Sprackland 2019 (France).

OECD 2019a). Notably, the OECD’s new Programme of Work not only is endorsed by the G20
but also commands a mandate, from the outset, from the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, which
boasts of 116 member countries.2 This represents both the highest-level and the broadest multigovernmental endorsement that efforts at international coordination in the realm of business
taxation have ever achieved.
What might serve as worthy focal points for such unprecedented global coordination?
Some prominent intellectuals have recently offered new articulations (or re-statements) of their
visions for why the international tax system must change (see, e.g. Summers 2019, Zucman
2019, Devereux and Freedman 2019). But most recent commentaries by academics and
practitioners continue to give more emphasis to certain narrowly-conceived means, rather than
the goals, of global coordination. Two themes are perhaps repeated most often. First,
international coordination should be organized within the longstanding framework of income tax
treaties. Second, under such a framework, countries’ claim of taxing rights over corporate profits
are to be given recognition through the legal concepts of “nexus” and “profit attribution” to
nexus. Moreover, countries should design mechanisms for avoiding “double taxation” and for
efficient dispute resolution. From these starting points, the “work” of reforming international
taxation quickly turns to technicalities. In fact, most of the OECD “programme of work” is
outlined by reference to these technicalities. The programme’s position seems to be that
whatever reallocation of taxing rights is agreed upon, they must be formulated and
comprehensible through the concepts of nexus, attribution of income to nexus (or “source of
income”), the alleviation of double taxation, and adequate dispute resolution. Although certain

By contrast, the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, launched in 2013, initially did not
proceed under the Inclusive Framework, which was set up only in 2016.
2
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new profit allocation rules are also suggested,3 their descriptions are similarly couched in
traditional treaty (especially transfer pricing) jargon, with more references to the technicalities of
administration than to what international tax reform is supposed to accomplish.
In this article, I argue that global coordination on business tax reform probably requires,
and certainly deserves, better ideas as focal points. The obvious advantage of steering such
coordination through the traditional tax treaty framework is the latter’s familiarity to businesses
and tax professionals. But this has to be weighed against two important disadvantages. First, the
concepts defining the treaty framework often stand for superfluous conventions. Clinging to these
conventions will likely impede discussions of reform by rendering reform objectives obscure.
Second, imposing the treaty boilerplate on the global debate about international tax reform also
restricts our view about what counts as international cooperation. Ultimately, this may restrict the
scope of such cooperation.
I illustrate these arguments through the comparison of two tax policy proposals. The first
is the EC’s 2018 proposal to introduce the concept of “significant digital presence”(SDP) into the
treaty framework. The second is the DST, which the EC (and other governments) presented as the
short-term policy substitute, pending an international consensus on the SDP proposal or other taxtreaty-based reform proposals. I argue that the SDP concept exposes the near-emptiness of the
treaty convention of allocating business profit through a two-step procedure: finding nexus, and
attributing profit to nexus. This lack of substance stems from two fallacies embodied in that
convention. The first is conflating criteria for determining the existence of an obligation to
compute taxable profits and the criteria for properly determining the extent of such profit. The
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In OECD 2019a, three proposals were identified: (1) user participation, (2) marketing intangibles, (3) significant
economic presence. In OECD 2019b, a re-labelling of approaches was adopted. Two “methods”, the modified
residual profit split method and the fractional apportionment method, and an “approach” (which is supposed to be
simpler than a “method”), the distribution-based approach, were briefly described.
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second is the pretention that the “arm’s length principle” provides a relevant guide to the allocation
of profits, even when no actual transaction among related parties occurs. Fitting proposals for
reallocating tax rights within this conventional two-step procedure perpetuates these fallacies
without advancing discussions of desirable reallocation.
By contrast, DST proposals embody the idea that countries should be entitled to tax
location-specific rent (LSR) associated with them. Within the realm of tax policy, taxing LSR is
widely supported by governments, scholars and businesses and is implemented through a wide
variety of taxes. It is not tied to and can be understood and evaluated independently of any
particular legal convention. The goal of giving countries the ability to claim a public share of the
economic rent that arises in them is pursued in a large variety of government policies, tax or nontax. Countries have an understanding about what it is to coordinate in the mutual pursuit of this
goal that is also not tied to any particular treaty framework, and have evidently achieved such
coordination with frequent success. Insofar as proposed DSTs adequately implement the objective
of taxing LSR, it is easy to state what international coordination around them requires without
reference to the tax treaty framework. This raises the question: Why should we, in the global debate
on reforming international taxation, (i) privilege the treaty framework for coordination (ii) at the
expense of obscuring the goals of coordination?
I have analyzed the design of the DST as a tax on LSR elsewhere (Cui 2019, Cui and
Hashimzade, 2019) and will only briefly summarize the analysis in Section III. This article focuses
on three sets of new arguments. First (Section II), I highlight the fallacies underlying the
conventional two-step procedure for allocating profits to countries. I am not aware of previous
commentaries explicitly criticizing the convention this way.4 Second, I defend (Section III) the
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This set of arguments in this Article complements arguments developed in Cui 2017a against other aspects of
treaty concepts and doctrines (namely that (1) the concepts of residence and source under international taxation
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DST against several common objections (specifically that (i) the DST inappropriately ring-fences
the digital economy, and (ii) the DST targets certain two-sided business models while excluding
others without any intelligible justification). Third, I explain what international coordination
around DST implementation requires (Section IV). Overall, I make the case that in structuring the
international community’s current effort to acknowledge and coordinate new claims of taxing
rights, coordination through the income tax treaty framework is far from being the only or the most
appropriate option.
II. SDP AND THE SUPERFLUOUSNESS OF THE TWO-STEP PROFIT ATTRIBUTION
CONVENTION
The OECD’s May 2019 Programme of Work asserts that all the new profit allocation rules
it considers and that may give shape to international tax reform “contemplate the existence of a
nexus in the absence of physical presence.” Therefore, the Programme “will explore the
development of a concept of remote taxable presence…and a new set of standards for identifying
when such a remote taxable presence exists”(OECD, 2019b, p.11). In this respect, the Programme
takes for granted a convention that no country can claim a taxing right over the business profit of
a foreign person without a presence or “nexus”. The concept of “nexus” is either a pre-requisite to
the allocation of taxing rights or at least an indispensable concept for making statements about
profit attribution. This convention is so ingrained in the tax treaty framework that it seems hard to
imagine international income taxation without it.5

possess minimal content, and (2) the prevention of “double taxation” cannot be relied on as a coherent goal for
international coordination.)
5
European legal scholars, even in proposals intended to boldly reimagine international taxation, invariably adheres
to this convention. See, e.g., Schön, 2018, Becker and Englisch, 2019.
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A. The EC SDP Proposal
Instead of waiting for the Programme of Work to be filled out, one can already find a good
illustration of how a new nexus concept might be elaborated in the EC’s March 2018 proposal for
amending tax treaties among the E.U. Member States. This proposal would allocate taxing rights
over the profits of digital platforms according to the Significant Digital Presence concept (EC
2018a). The EC SDP Proposal contains specific language for a Directive to be adopted by the
European Council, in addition to an Explanatory Memorandum, as well as extensive recitals, that
elaborate the policy objectives of the proposed Directive. The proposal would extend the treaty
concept of “permanent establishment” (PE) to include a “significant digital presence” (Article 4
of the proposed Directive). A business will have an SDP in a Member state if, in a given tax period:
(a) the revenues from providing digital services to users in that Member State exceed €7 million;
(b) the number of users of one or more of those digital services located in the Member State
exceeds 100,000; or (c) the number of contracts for supplying digital services concluded by
business users located in the Member State exceeds 3,000 (Article 4(3)).
In addition, a range of activities pursued by an enterprise in connection with an SDP would
be regarded as “economically significant activities” of the enterprise. 6 These activities are
conceived as constituting the “development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and
exploitation of intangible assets” in the SDP jurisdiction, and therefore justify profit attribution to
the jurisdiction (even though the activities are physically carried outside the jurisdiction). Finally,
“profit attribution” to an SDP would follow two principles. First, it would be consistent with the

The definition of “economically significant activities” is broad and encompasses, inter alia, “(a) the collection,
storage, processing, analysis, deployment and sale of user-level data; (b) the collection, storage, processing and
display of user-generated content; (c) the sale of online advertising space; (d) the making available of third-party
created content on a digital marketplace; and (e) the supply of any digital service not listed in points (a) to (d).”
Article 5(5)
6
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arm’s length principle (ALP).7 Second, it would extensively rely on the profit split method used in
current transfer pricing rules but would consider factors beyond expenses incurred for research,
development and marketing to include “the number of users and data collected per Member State”
(Article 5(6)). This way, profit attribution to an SDP aims “to reflect the way value is created in
digital activities.”8
The language of the EC proposed Directive for attributing profits to an SDP adopts very
similar formulations to the general principles of profit attribution to a PE under the OECD model
tax convention. Even though the proposed Directive has received little commentary—because the
political feasibility within the EC of its adoption was always doubtful—it would not be surprising
if the OECD’s Programme of Work ends up with recommendations very much like it. What,
though, does this set of legal language accomplish?
It is useful to paraphrase the EC’s proposed profit attribution procedure. Once a digital
company has enough dealings with a country (defined as revenue from, the number of users located
within, or the number of contracts concluded with users so located), it has an SDP there. The
revenue sources, contracts, or users are then conceived as intangible assets to which certain
activities of the company (i.e. those that are “economically significant”) are attributed. This is the
first step in profit attribution, and it comprises two conceptual maneuvers: (1) customers/users are
treated as assets of the digital company, and (2) activities associated with tangible assets (e.g.
servers) and activities (employees) of digital company outside the SDP jurisdiction are attributed
to the intangible assets conceptualized in (1). In the second step of profit attribution, profits are

“The profits attributable to or in respect of the SDP shall be those that the digital presence would have earned if it
had been a separate and independent enterprise performing the same or similar activities under the same or similar
conditions, in particular in its dealings with other parts of the enterprise, taking into account the functions
performed, assets used and risks assumed, through a digital interface” (Article 5(2))
8
EC, 2018a, p.8 (detailed explanation of Article 5).
7
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determined for the activities conceptualized in the first step, as though those activities are carried
out by a third-party business independent of the rest of the enterprise.
How is this different from simply identifying a sufficient volume of transactions with (or
user participation from) a jurisdiction, and asking how much profit is generated from such
transactions or participation, and how much should be allocated to the user jurisdiction for
potential taxation? Besides stating a threshold of taxing right, the insertion of a “nexus” concept
(i.e. SDP) appears to do the work of bringing into fictional existence a non-physical and internal
component of the digital company (i.e. assets and activities in the SDP jurisdiction)—just so that
it can be undone by a further fiction, that of arm’s length transactions among internal divisions.
This is paradoxical, in more than one way. When the arm’s length relationship between digital
platforms and their users are already in plain daylight, why does one need to create a fictional
arm’s length relation among them? Moreover, in the case of two-sided business models—which
many of the digital companies embroiled in the international tax reform debate implement—one
set of users (e.g. individual users of Google or Facebook) may be located in a different country
from other users (e.g. advertisers) that the platforms bring together. According to the SDP concept,
the SDPs thus found in different countries should be treated as transacting with the platform, and
with one another, as independent enterprises. Yet the very concept of two-sided business models
is that one business brings two sets of users together that would not otherwise be able to interact
with one another, and profit from such ability to intermediate (see Section III for further
discussion).
The most important point to note about the SDP concept, though, is not its paradoxical
nature. It is that it does nothing to speak to the questions: how much profit is generated from user
participation, and how much of the profit should be allocated to the user jurisdiction for potential

8

taxation? The work of answering these questions seems to be left to the profit attribution rules.
The SDP concept itself is silent on them. Why, then, is the concept necessary?
B. Two-Step Profit Attribution Convention in General
The above argument may be read as picking the easy target of an already unpopular policy
proposal. That is not my intention in making it here. The point is instead that the same argument
can be made against the thoroughly familiar and widely accepted profit attribution convention
under the income tax treaty framework. Under this convention, a country can claim taxing rights
on a non-residents business profits only when a PE (the archetypical nexus concept) is found, and
the extent of the consequently-taxable profit is determined as what is “attributable” to the PE. I
would argue that this two-step convention is itself as empty and as paradoxical as the SDP concept,
and roughly for the same reasons.
The problem of the treaty profit-attribution convention can be described in terms of two
fallacies. The first is a conflation between an obligation to compute taxable profit and how such
profit should be computed. The second is a confusion about the utility of the ALP when no actual
related party transactions or pricing is involved.
1. The obligation to compute taxable profit v. the extent of the taxable profit
Under income tax treaties, the PE concept is used to ground the right of a country to tax
non-residents’ business profits.9 This does not mean that the country in which a PE is found will
necessarily have anything to tax: it is possible that no net profit is attributed to a PE. A PE merely
stands for a status that requires the non-resident enterprise with a PE to calculate its net profit
arising from the country in which the PE is located. There are thus two (logically exhaustive) ways

9

PE is not the only ground for the exercise of taxing rights under the income tax over non-residents. Countries can
levy withholding taxes (or even taxes on net income, in the case of capital gain) on non-residents in the absence of a
PE.
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of interpreting the PE concept. One is that it is purely an administrative threshold, meeting which
leads to an obligation, on the part of a non-resident, to compute taxable business profit from the
PE jurisdiction. The other is that PE stands not only for a compliance obligation, but also implies
a judgment that there is enough taxable profit attributable to the PE country that an explicit
determination of the extent of such profit (through the filing of income tax returns that allocate
income and expenses) is in order.
Yet these two possibilities create a dilemma for explaining the concept of PE. On the one
hand, if PE is purely an administrative concept, there is no such thing as an amount of profit
properly attributable to a PE. No amount of taxable profit is naturally or inherently attributable to
a mere obligation to compute taxable profit. This implies that the exercise of determining the profit
attributable to a PE is literally nonsensical. Whatever profit is determined to be taxable in the PE
jurisdiction must be so determined by virtue of something other than the existence of a PE (qua
obligation to compute net income).
On the other hand, if the application of the PE concept carries some implicit judgment that
enough taxable profit is likely attributable to the PE jurisdiction, then the attribution of profit is
already being done by the finding of a PE in the first place. One should be able to make such
implicit judgments explicit without even referring to the concept of PE or nexus. This possibility
also raises the question of whether there can be judgments about the appropriate attribution of
business profits to a jurisdiction independently of the judgments implicit in any PE concept. If the
answer is yes, profit attribution again is independent of the PE concept, and the latter cannot be
presented as a pre-requisite for making statements about profit attribution.
The challenge this dilemma poses for the two-step profit attribution convention is severe.
Each horn of the dilemma implies that the PE concept is irrelevant for specifying how profit should
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be attributed to a jurisdiction. And neither horn is easy to escape. For instance, few probably would
deny that the PE concept is heavily coloured by administrative concerns, making the first horn of
the dilemma a serious threat. The history of inbound taxation In the United States offers an
especially vivid illustration of how “nexus” often functions purely as a compliance requirement.
As documented in Sicular and Sobol, 2003, between 1913 and 1936, all foreign persons were
subject to net-income-basis taxation on income from sources within the U.S.. There was no PElike threshold on the United States’ power to tax foreigners’ net income. In 1936, a version of this
threshold was introduced: only foreign persons engaged in a U.S. trade or business or who had an
office or place of business needed to report their U.S. source income on annual tax returns and pay
tax on such income on a net basis. While the “trade or business” or “office or place of business”
concepts seem to instantiate the notion of nexus, they, in fact, sustained no profit attribution
exercise: once a foreigner triggers a return-filing obligation, all U.S.-source incomes are taxed in
the same fashion. This “force of attraction” regime displayed no concern to attribute net profit to
a particular U.S. “trade or business” or “office or place of business”.
Before 1966, the force of attraction regime was modified only to deal with tax avoidance
and offered a competing paradigm to the European approach of profit attribution to PEs.10 It was
not until 1966, facing a balance of payment crisis, that the U.S. abandoned the force of attraction
regime for FDAP income and capital gains, and introduced the concept of “income effectively
connected” to a U.S. trade or business. Even so, a “residual force of attraction” regime is retained
under I.R.C. Sec. 864(c)(3) and Sec. 897: the obligation to file full U.S. income tax returns remains
somewhat independent of the nature and extent of income reportable on such return.

10

The force of attraction regime had parallels in other parts of the world and, even today, is an acknowledged
practice in the United Nation’s Commentaries on its model tax convention.
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The second horn of the dilemma is similarly pressed by real-world examples. A number of
governments have in recent years enacted taxes on the business profit of non-residents in the
absence of PEs, arguing that taxing rights over profits arising from their jurisdictions should not
be defeated by the successful avoidance of PE status. These taxes—including the U.K.’s diverted
profit tax (DPT) and Australia’s Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law (MAAL)—have been subject
to vicious criticism, on the ground that they violate the enacting governments’ treaty obligations
(which makes PEs a prerequisite for the taxation of non-resident’s business profits). Such
criticisms, however, are immediately undermined by the legal argument that PE is a relevant
concept only for treaty-covered taxes. Taxes that do not tie taxing right to PEs may simply not be
covered by tax treaties (Wagman, 2015).
The fundamental reason for the weakness of treaty-based objections to the DPT or MAAL
is that those who make them fail to state a persuasive, independent case that the profits that the
U.K. or Australian governments aim to tax through these novel tax instruments are not properly
allocable to these countries. The objection is only that, legally, a PE is absent. But this simply
reinforces the governments’ claims that the traditional PE criteria fail to capture intuitions about
where business profits are allocable, and that these intuitions can be sensibly stated without the PE
concept.11
2. The irrelevance of ALP
The main principle guiding the second step of the conventional profit attribution approach,
the ALP, is also superfluous. This can be explained more briefly. The ALP originates from Article
9 (related enterprises) in income tax treaties. The idea is that while the pricing of related party
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The failure of the PE concept to capture many intuitions about profit attribution explains why tax jurisdictional
claims have become quite fluid in the post-BEPS world. Again, it is important to remember that PE is a
jurisdictional threshold only for net-income-based taxation, even within treaty-covered taxes. It is far from the only
basis for asserting taxing jurisdiction under international law.
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transactions may alter the profits computed for the related parties, it does not alter the aggregate
profit of the related parties. Therefore, the actual pricing of related party transactions may not be
reliable in determining the parties’ respective profits. Consequently, arm’s length pricing needs to
be consulted. That is, in the related party context, ALP is used to correct the impact of actual
pricing of actual related party transactions on the determination of profits. The extension of ALP
to Article 7 (profit attribution to a PE), however, faces an immediate objection. The PE and the
non-resident company it forms a part of are not distinct legal entities. Often, they do not engage in
actual transactions. Unless, for non-tax reasons, the PE and the rest of the enterprise to which the
PE belongs record nominal transactions and corresponding prices, the existence of separate
persons and transactions is itself fictional. The threat of mispricing in such transactions is therefore
also fictional. The ALP is simply irrelevant.
The takeaway is that the two-step profit attribution approach adopted by income tax treaties
is not only a very oblique convention for allocating taxing rights over multinational profits, it often
does not provide guidance over such allocation at all. The irony is that when an upheaval in
international taxation is fueled by countries’ insistence to reallocate taxing rights, the OECD, EC
and many others in the international tax community seem to insist that the best long-term solution
can only be found by sticking to this oblique convention.
To some readers, it may seem surprising that the critiques of the superfluousness of twostep profit attribution convention stated in this Section are not already widely understood. I believe
that the reason why they have not aroused much prior interest is that, relative to transfer pricing
among related parties, profit attribution to PEs is a small portion of international tax planning and
also generates negligible revenue for governments. Most multi-national corporations operate their
foreign operations through subsidiaries rather than unincorporated business presences that give
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rise to PEs. The amount of tax at stake in Article 7 profit attribution, therefore, has been relatively
small. But when the OECD, EC, and other governments look to the nexus concept to reform
international taxation in the age of digitization, they are precisely looking to this relatively obscure
corner of international taxation for principles to ground the future of international taxation. The
conventions in this area, however, simply cannot bear that weight.
III. THE DST
Arguably, the most important contrast between the SDP proposal (and other similar treatybased proposals) and proposals for enacting a digital services tax is that the latter speak directly to
the question: where is profit located? The basic rationale that the EC, U.K., and other governments
gave for the DST is that there is a misalignment between where value is created for certain digital
platform companies and where the current international tax regime allocates taxing rights. The
concept of the place of user created value is front and center.
A. A Direct Approach to Identifying Profit Location
The “user value creation” concept has a natural and compelling interpretation when applied
to certain digital platforms (Cui, 2019). Many such platforms—Google, Facebook, Amazon
Marketplace, Uber, Airbnb, to name a few prominent examples—operate two-sided (or multisided) businesses. That is, they simultaneously provide different types of services to different sets
of users, and do so because of externalities among these different sets of users: at least one type of
user (on one “side”) cares about what the other type of users (on “the other side”) do, including
how many such latter users there are. Such “indirect network effects” create the possibility for
two-sided businesses to manipulate the structure of the prices charged to each side, and rely on
variations in price structure (even when the aggregate price charged to the two sides for a given
transaction is fixed) to maximize transaction volume and profit (Rochet and Tirole, 2006). For
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example, a two-sided business can price below marginal cost on one side (i.e. providing a subsidy
to that side), thereby increasing the number of users on that side, and make up for the loss on the
other side, because users on the second side value the larger number of users on the first side and
are willing to pay for it.
Two-sided business models are not new: newspapers, credit card networks, and
broadcasting supported by advertising revenue are examples of earlier incarnations. What is new
is that some of the largest multinational companies in the world today operate such models, with
users participating from different jurisdictions. This has direct implications for international
taxation. A platform may provide services at prices below cost to users on one side in a given
country while charging users on another side in a different country for access to the first set of
users. Users on the first side are crucial for the platform company’s ability to profit from users on
the second side, yet such “user value creation” in the country of the first side may be accompanied
by little or no payment from that country.
Consider, for example, a stylized depiction of Facebook’s business model (Figure 1).
Facebook offers free social media service to users from all over the world while offering
advertising services to advertisers for a price. Suppose American companies purchase advertising
slots on Facebook targeted at French consumers, in the hope that the latter would purchase their
goods or services.12 Facebook earns a profit from such American producers and receives payments
from them in the United States. Even if Facebook has a PE in France, there may be no reason to
attribute the profit Facebook earns from American advertisers to the French PE: such profit may
simply have no connection with the activities of the PE. However, there is a clear and distinct

12

When the American companies make sales of goods or services to French consumers, the sales may be subject to
the French VAT or other taxes on sales (whether they are subject to French income tax depends on whether they
have a PE in France).
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sense in which Facebook’s profit earned from the ads targeted at the French are based on value
creation in France. The American companies are willing to pay Facebook only because they expect
the ads would boost sales in France. And there is no boosting of sales in France unless French
consumers use Facebook’s social media platform. In this sense, the French users’ participation
makes Facebook a profitable seller of advertising. Moreover, although the use of Facebook is
enabled by Facebook’s technology and services, often delivered away from the user jurisdiction,
Facebook’s placement of ads targeted at French users has no opportunity cost in terms of ads
targeted at users elsewhere. Therefore, Facebook’s profits from French-targeted ads can be earned
only from French users. This leads to the conclusion: French users created value for Facebook.
In this interpretation, the “user value creation” concept identifies, in the foregoing example,
a location of profit that is distinct from both the source of payment to Facebook (i.e. the United
States) and the locations of Facebook’s physical assets and personnel. It does not identify such
location by analogy to the PE concept (e.g. by asserting that French users represent intangible
assets of Facebook’s) or any other concept of “nexus”. Instead, the concept plausibly connects
Facebook’s profit to France, and thereby supports a potential claim by France to tax Facebook’s
profit, independently of any existing convention of international income tax law. An important
question, therefore, is why one must bend such a concept (and the reasoning it supports) into the
mold of the conventions of income taxation to be considered and to attain legitimacy.
The DST is a way of implementing the “user value creation” concept outside the income
tax framework. In the above example, France would impose a 3% DST on Facebook’s revenue
from ads targeted at French users, thus claiming a share of Facebook’s profit that it could not claim
under the existing international income tax regime. The DST can be analogized to a variety of
taxes that are distinct from the regular corporate income tax and that are also imposed on location-
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specific business profits, such as royalties and resource rent taxes on natural resource extraction
(Cui and Hashimzade, 2019). Like these other taxes, the DST takes a view about where profit is
located and is specifically tailored to taxing such profit.
B. “Ring-Fencing” and Other Objections
The most dismissive objections against the DST have been premised on the assumption
that the “user value creation” concept is incoherent, ad hoc, or hopelessly vague. Once that concept
is interpreted in terms of location-specific platform rent, however, many of these objections
quickly fall away.
Take, for example, the popular slogan that one cannot “ring-fence” the digital economy
and change international tax rules just for a few sectors (especially not just for a few big American
companies). What, however, is the principle against “ring-fencing” exactly? If it is that a uniform
set of international tax rules must apply to the taxation of all businesses, then the principle has no
subscribers. Even within the utterly conventional world of tax treaties, differential treatments
abound. Special provisions are made for the taxation of the labour income of artists, athletes,
educators, and diplomats in contrast to the general provisions for taxing cross-border labour
income. International transportation income and sometimes income from technical services are
treated differently from other types of business profit. Income from real properties can also be
taxed differently from other types of investment income. The domestic law provisions of each
country governing the income taxation of cross-border transactions usually offer an even greater
variety of differential treatments. If a special set of income tax rules can be designed and agreed
upon for taxing online advertising, would a provision setting out such rules even look out of place
in tax treaties?
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The principle against ring-fencing, therefore, must reflect simply the notion that no
arbitrary distinction should be drawn among different business models and sectors in re-designing
income taxation in the digital age. This notion is quite weak, however, and has bite only when one
assumes that new taxes like the DST serve no purpose.13 The concept of location-specific rent is
not arbitrary, nor is the notion of “user value creation” when interpreted in terms of LSR.
Suggestions that the distinctions drawn by the DST are arbitrary must be backed by more specific
arguments. Consider, for instance, the question14: “There are so many two-sided businesses, old
and new, why shouldn’t the DST be imposed on all of them?” The answer is clear. The DST is
designed to deal with problems in international taxation created by two-sided businesses—
specifically, the misalignment between value creation (a la rent location) and the source of
payment. Many two-sided businesses do not generate such misalignment (or at least not to a
substantial degree).15 The business models initially selected to be the target of the DST clearly
instantiate such mis-alignment. Governments proposing the DST are well aware of other two-sided
digital businesses. Such businesses are explicitly outside the scope of the DST, based on an implicit
judgment that there is no (substantial) misalignment in those cases.
Another type of objection that has been made against the DST is that as currently proposed,
it is not applied to all cases of location-specific platform rent. This is quite likely true: the DST
has faced such vehement opposition that governments that propose it may well hesitate before
expanding the scope of the tax. However, this also clearly does not lead to the conclusion that the
DST should not be enacted. Countries try to tax LSR from the extraction of certain natural
Many early critics of the DST assumed that the notion of “user value creation” merely reflects platitudes such as
“all producer surplus depends on there being consumers”, or “all consumer surplus from market goods depends on
there being producers.” The idea that specific instances of platform rent can be traced to particular consumer or
producer location is clearly distinct from such platitudes.
14
This question is implied by Grinberg, 2018 in his discussion of the Lloyd’s insurance marketplace.
15
When foreign merchants pay domestic newspapers or owners of ad boards to advertise to domestic consumers, for
instance, the country of the consumers has no trouble taxing the newspapers or ad board owner.
13
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resources such as oil and gas, but probably fail to tax other forms of LSR. This is not an argument
against the levying of resource rent taxes or royalties!
It is also important to note here that there is a variety of ways for governments to claim a
public share of location-specific rent. Consider the observation in Grinberg 2018 that patients
participating in clinical trials represent an important form of “user participation” generating value
for pharmaceutical companies. Should the profit of pharmaceutical companies, therefore, be
taxable in the countries where the patients undertake clinical trials? This seems at least initially
not implausible. Indeed, arguably, governments already do it, by regulating drug prices, adopting
policies of public procurement for certain drugs, or imposing import tariffs (Bankman, Kane and
Sykes, 2018). The variety of policy instruments available to capture location specific rent may
explain why governments do not always take special measures under the corporate income tax.
But if they do so, it could appeal to similar justifications as the deployment of these other policy
instruments.
A more positive way for DST proponents to state their argument is this. The DST does not
ring-fence the digital economy. There is indeed nothing special about the digital per se. Locationspecific rents earned by digital platforms are just like location-specific rent earned by companies
extracting oil, mineral, timber, and other tangible natural resources. The principles for taxing
digital platforms are fundamentally the same as for taxing these other sectors. Indeed, taxes
separate from the income tax can be imposed on both, and both tax and non-tax policy instruments
might be deployed.
IV. WHAT IS HARMFUL ABOUT UNILATERALISM?
An alleged inferiority of the DST is that its imposition would not be coordinated with
taxing rights currently recognized under income tax treaties. Here, it is useful to distinguish
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between two types of coordination problems. First, suppose that countries design and implement
the DST to capture rent specifically located in them. The need for coordination may seem to
arise because under the existing international regime, taxing rights over such rent is also
allocated to what traditionally are regarded as either residence or source countries. Second,
countries may also enact DSTs to achieve objectives other than the exercise of taxing rights over
rents located in them. Some countries, for example, may impose new taxes on advertising on
digital platforms to put digital companies on an equal footing with traditional companies that
have physical presences in them (“equalization” taxes). In this case, conflicting designs of the
DST need to be coordinated, in addition to coordination with taxing rights already enshrined in
income treaties.
In assessing the relative merits of the DST and the SDP proposal, it is the first type of
coordination that is more relevant. Here, the key question is what would happen in the absence of
coordination. Income tax treaties enable coordination between source and residence countries
through two types of mechanisms. First, the residence country offers the foreign tax credit (FTC)
or exemption treatment with respect to income subject to tax in a source country. Second, the
source country cedes taxing right to residence country in other cases. Suppose that certain
platform rent can be shown to be locatable in country X, but X is not regarded as the “source” of
the platform firm’s income under traditional rules.16 Then it is likely that the residence country
would not grant FTC for the DST charged (even putting aside the fact that the DST is not an
income tax), or would not treat the platform firm’s income (including X-specific rent) as exempt
foreign income. Alternatively, yet another country may claim that it is the source of income that

For instance, in the Facebook example given in Section III, Facebook’s income would not be treated as Frenchsource, but as U.S.-source, since the income is earned from U.S. advertisers.
16
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X subjects to the DST.17 In that case, that source country may provide neither credit nor
exemption for the revenue subject to tax in X.
How bad is this kind of non-coordination? Despite perennial rhetoric against international
double taxation, a reasonable reply is: it is unclear. Without FTC or exemption, the default
treatment in most residence countries for foreign taxes paid is to grant a deduction. If the DST is
successfully designed as a tax on economic rent, however, a deduction of the DST from the
income tax base would still leave room for an income tax to be imposed without causing
distortions. Indeed, regular corporate income taxation has always left ample room for the
imposition of additional taxes on supra normal returns (e.g. “excess profits”). Historically, many
such taxes on economic rent (typically imposed by “source” countries that also represent the
locations of the rent) have been left out of treaty-based coordination, i.e. they are not treated as
treaty-covered taxes (Cui 2017b). Under domestic law, such taxes that do not qualify as income
taxes (e.g. resources royalties) would also not be eligible for foreign tax credits. In other words,
it is not clear why one should adopt the presumption that the DST should be creditable against
income taxes, instead of being deductible from taxable income. But in the absence of such a
presumption, the non-coordination between the DST and regular corporate income taxation also
raises no special concern.
What should be of greater concern is the imposition of DSTs that do not aim to capture
location specific platform rent, or that take conflict views about where such rent is located. For
example, some recent proposed taxes on online advertising that have been lumped together with
the DST include India’s Equalization Levy and Italy’s Levy on Digital Transactions, both of
which are imposed by the jurisdictions of the advertisers. If the advertising revenue that

For instance, Facebook’s advertising revenue targeted as French consumers may be booked to a permanent
establishment in a third country.
17
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Facebook receives from Italian or Indian manufacturers targeted at French consumers are subject
to such revenue-based taxes in addition to the French DST, then it is plausible that Facebook
may be over-burdened. But the reason for such mis-coordination is that these new taxes on
digital services take conflicting views about where profit from such services should be attributed.
It is not that they are not coordinated under the income tax system.
Notably, the EC DST proposal from 2018 already contemplates coordination among such
new taxes. The EC proposed to levy a single 3% tax on all revenue from digital services earned
within the EU, and would apportion the revenue to EU Member States according to the number
of users in them. For online intermediation, “users” from Member States may be from different
sides of digital platforms. This apportionment approach ensures that online intermediation
services are not subject to tax in both the buyer and seller jurisdictions. While the approach does
not adhere to the purity of the rationale for the DST as a tax on location-specific rent, it would
represent a pragmatic compromise to alleviate concerns about over-taxation.
V. CONCLUSION

When the EC and the UK government proposed their DSTs in 2018, both cast the DST as
an interim measure that is compatible with the current tax treaty framework and does not require
a revision of the latter. Such revision would be a long-term objective, embodied in the EC SDP
proposal and now taken on by the OECD. The arguments of the preceding sections, however,
suggests that there might be no “there” there in the contemplated long-term. If the momentum for
international tax reform comes from a need to reallocate taxing rights, then one must take note of
the fact that the DST addresses this need directly and explicitly, whereas how the SDP proposal
(and treaty-based proposals generally) may address such need is far from clear.
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Ultimately, it’s problematic to equate international tax coordination with the traditional
income tax treaty framework. The problem can be described as follows. The treaty framework is
characterized by three fundamental limitations. First, it is focused on the income tax. Countries
have always had the option to, but for the most part chose not to, coordinate their tax bases under
other taxes through the tax treaty framework. Second, tax treaties do not have a lot to say about
how to allocate business profit to different countries. As Section II argued, the ALP and
attribution of business profits to PEs are fairly shallow conventions that guide profit allocation
only in limited circumstances. Much of profit attribution relies instead on domestic laws, as well
as pure personal jurisdiction (e.g. corporate residence in the case of corporate profits). Third, the
goal of treaty-based coordination is explicitly stated as the avoidance of double taxation. Treaty
mechanisms for mitigating double taxation, however, largely assume profit allocations made
independently of treaty guidance. In other words, once we know how profit is allocated to
different jurisdictions, we know how double taxation can be avoided.
Insofar as the current international tax debate arises because countries have come to
disagree on how taxing rights over corporate profit should be allocated (and because new
allocations are advocated), recognizing these limitations of the tax treaty framework has
enormous implications. First, it implies that it would be irrational to subordinate the goal of
acknowledging new allocations of taxing rights to the goal of avoiding double taxation. Tax
treaties cannot be said to succeed if they mitigate double taxation but only at the cost of
preserving allocations that go against countries’ wishes. Second, previous treaty formulae for
profit attribution may altogether lack relevance. Third, the question must be asked: is
international coordination the goal, or is coordination through the income tax the goal? To
assume that the answer is the latter is to assume a lot. Instead, international coordination around
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new claims of taxing rights may take the form of agreements to resolve problems in the joint
imposition of new taxes—much in the spirit of the EC DST proposal (binding on all EU Member
States). Such agreements can take the form of binding treaties, as exemplified by long-standing
bilateral treaties regarding social security taxes, taxes on international transportation, or estate,
inheritance, or other taxes on capital. Or they can take the form of customary practice as
instantiated by the wide adoption of the destination-based VAT. Alternatively, such coordination
may simply be done through an acknowledgement that new taxes imposed are not in conflict
with existing international obligations, much as the imposition of resource royalties, resource
rent taxes, taxes on extraordinary profits, and similar taxes by different governments—all of
which, in some sense, stake out new claims of taxing rights over multinationals’ profits—have
been accepted by the international community.
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